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photo Uzbekistan

Tamerlane’s Samarkand

Samarkand is one of those relatively rare places that we almost instinctively know the name of, even if we have no idea where it is or where we heard of it–somehow, it is a part of our collective consciousness. Now Uzbekistan’s second-largest city, Samarkand’s history is ancient, going back at least to Sogdian times (post on the Sogdians to come), but its greatest era was when it became the capital of Tamerlane’s Central Asian empire.

Amir Temur, known to the western world as Tamerlane (Timur the Lame, and indeed the remains in his tomb confirmed that one of his legs was not well), was born in 1336 in the city now called Shakhrisabz south of Samarkand and was said to be a descent of Genghis Khan. In his young adulthood he became known for his successes as a military leader, and eventually rose to head the local Turkic tribes. Using Samarkand as his capital and base, he led campaigns in all compass directions, reaching as far as now Turkey and Georgia in the west, now India in the east and Moscow to the north. Tamerlane was preparing an attack on Ming China when he died, almost 70 years old.

From the wealth of his various conquests (from Delhi it is said that he carried away 90 elephants’ loads of precious stones), and by conscripting artisans from far-away lands, he built up his capital, leaving it the city of architectural marvels that it is today. Tamerlane has become a national icon for Uzbekistan since independence, and Tamerlane sights in Samarkand have been recipients of a great deal of recent renovation.

Bibi Khanum Mosque, Samarkand, named after Tamerlane’s Chinese wife

Shah-i-Zinda, Samarkand. This necropolis, built near the grave of a cousin of Mohammed is who said to have brought Islam to Central Asia, contains mausoleums of many family members and descendents of Tamerlane.

Registan, Samarkand (three facing madrasas built by Tamerlane’s successors)

Remnant of the enormous portal to Tamerlane’s summer palace Ak Saray, Shakhrisabz

Tamerlane was more famous for destruction and plunder than true empire-building, and his empire did not last long after his death. His descendent Babur, however, would go on to found the Mughal dynasty of India. Tamerlane and Babur were in a sense the last of the many great Mongol or Turkic conquerors who swept out of the Central Asian plains to control huge swaths of Asia–perhaps one day the Central Asians will unite again and create a new empire!

Crypt originally built for but unused by Tamerlane, Shakhrisabz

Gur-i Emir, Tamerlane’s mausoleum in Samarkand

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Iran photo Uzbekistan

Avicenna

The Islamic world’s contribution to the sciences is great, especially during the European Middle Ages when much western classical knowledge had been lost or forgotten. Unfortunately, I do not know too much about Muslim scientists and mathematicians, but I thought I would write this brief post on Avicenna, whose prominence is attested by the fact that his name is recognizable to us, even if we do not know who he is. Avicenna’s life is not only a reminder of the significance of scientists from the Middle East in the history of western science but also a portrait of the Persian world in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

Abdulla ibn Sina was born in 980 near Bukhara, now Uzbekistan, which was at that time the capital of the Samanid empire (see my post of 6.12). It is said that Avicenna had memorized the Koran by age 7 and learned mathematics from an Indian living in Bukhara. (Unfortunately, there are no specific Avicenna-related sites within the city of Bukhara, the city having been destroyed by the Mongols in the intervening years.)

Learning the art and science of medicine, Avicenna became a royal physician, using the royal library in Bukhara to advance his knowledge, until the Samanid empire came to an end in the beginning of the eleventh century. Avicenna wandered westward seeking the patronage of various ministers and royalty, through the extent of the eastern Persian world from Bukhara to Urgench (in now Uzbekistan) to Merv (now Turkmenistan) to Nishapur to Gorgan (both now eastern Iran). For a while he was settled in the city of Rey, near modern Tehran, and the town of Qazvin nearby, until finally he became a royal physician in the city of Hamadan. In 1037 he died in Hamadan, where a modern tomb was erected for him in 2000.

During his lifetime Avicenna wrote literally hundreds of works on numerous subjects, but his most famous legacy is The Canon of Medicine, which compiled not only the fruits of his own experimentation but the knowledge of everyone from classical Greek to Indian scientists coming before him. The Canon of Medicine was used as a medical textbook in Europe into the 18th century, and Avicenna is considered a father of modern medicine, laying out the principles of the experimental method in clinical trials.

Other scientists of Persian cultural extraction who were from now Uzbekistan include al-Beruni, a 10th-11th century scientist who calculated the size of the earth and its distance to the sun and moon with startling accuracy, and al-Khorezmi, an 8th-9th century mathematician whose name survives in the word “algorithm” and from the title of whose book the word “algebra” is derived.

Al-Khorezmi statue, Khiva

Monument to al-Beruni, Urgench

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photo Uzbekistan

Samanids

This post can be read as part of a series of an overview of Iranian history–please refer to my posts of 5.10, 5.11, 5.19, 5.27 and 6.1.

***

After the Arab conquest of now Iran in the seventh century, the Persian world, with its great history and traditions, became a mere portion of the Arab Empire, which in its first hundred years was led from Damascus with a general attitude of Arab supremacy over the conquered peoples, despite in many cases such peoples’ richer and more ancient civilizations. While Persian influence grew stronger in the Arab domains during the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad, credit for true Persian revival, it may be said, belongs to the Samanid dynasty (819-999), which ruled over Central Asia and the eastern parts of now Iran from its capital in Bukhara in now Uzbekistan.

The Samanid dynasty, despite its relatively brief reign, is responsible for a considerable portion of historical Iranian culture, including the works of Rudaki, a poet considered a founder of Persian literature (Iran’s Shakespeare, if you will), and Ferdosi, whose epic Shahnameh is the Iliad of Iran. The Samanids also fostered a blossoming of the sciences, including the career of Avicenna [post on Avicenna and other scientists of the era to come].

To finish this post, I wanted to share with you some photographs of my favorite building in Uzbekistan and one of my favorite buildings anywhere–the 10th century mausoleum of Ismail Samani, perhaps the greatest of the Samanid rulers (referenced in my post of 6.3). This building alone of Samanid Bukhara survived the near total destruction of the Mongol conquest, some say because it was covered by sand, and thankfully so.




[Addendum: The post-independence government of Tajikistan, which uniquely of the Central Asian Stans is an Iranian ethnic rather than a Turkic ethnic state, is actively relating its origin back to the Samanids, the Samanid dynasty being perhaps the most brilliant flowering of Eastern Iranian civilization, and now not only does a prominent statue of Ismail Samani stand in a central square in Dushanbe but the Tajik currency is called the Samani. However, the Samanid capital of Bukhara and another Central Asian center of Iranian/Tajik culture, Samarkand, are within the state of Uzbekistan–post on ethnicity in Central Asia to come.]

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photo Uzbekistan

Bukhara Redux

2003

2008

As we grow better traveled, we find ourselves returning to places we’ve been. Second and third visits give you the benefit of familiarity, an opportunity to examine a place in greater depth with perhaps greater knowledge/context, and the perspective of time. I thought worthwhile a post comparing our visit to Bukhara in 2003 with our visit in 2008, with these topics in mind. (Cf. my post of 3.6 on changes in Varkala, India over the same period.)

Perhaps the nicest, most immediate feeling of returning to a place is familiarity. All of us are to a certain extent creatures of habit, and there is something comforting about seeing a place you know, as long as your prior experiences were positive. Having loved Bukhara on our first visit, it felt more personal and charming on our second. Working our way through the streets, we felt a closer connection, because we ourselves had already had history in the place. We recalled memories from our prior trip, where we had stayed, what we had seen, whom we had met. We tried to figure out where we had bought our embroideries, where we had changed money. Most fun of all, we tracked down a girl who had sold us some souvenirs in 2003 and impressed us so much with her charm and smarts that we had often thought of her in the intervening years. She was still there, selling souvenirs, and we spent a great deal of time chatting with her and her friends, and finally inviting them to a dinner out. (See photographs at the top of this post to see how she matured!)

Our favorite building in Bukhara, the Ismail Samani Mausoleum, thankfully unchanged

Repeat visits also provide an opportunity to see things you didn’t on an earlier visit, either because you didn’t have time or because you didn’t recognize what was before you. On our past trip to Bukhara, we knew of the historic Jewish community but didn’t seek out any specific Jewish sites. Having been introduced to the Bukharan Jewish community in New York CIty since, and seen Jewish areas in India and Syria, I am far more interested now in discovering Jewish sites, in particular those that are geographically remote or have been largely abandoned by their Jewish former inhabitants. This time, not only are we staying in a bed and breakfast in a formerly Jewish home, but we tracked down a local synagogue (unfortunately closed when we visited) and a Jewish cemetery. I wondered how many of the people buried had relatives living in Queens.

Interior, Akbar House, a former Jewish home

Jewish Synagogue

Jewish Cemetery

Other things may have been before you the whole time, but you recognize it because you’re a little older and more experienced. In 2003, it wasn’t immediately apparent to me exactly how unreligious Uzbeks are, because I had nothing to compare them to, my experience in Islamic countries being limited. Now, especially after traveling in Iran, it is almost shocking to see how secular Uzbekistan is, its mosques and madrasas still for the most part standing empty as museums or filled with souvenirs for sale, rather than being places for worship and religious study. Being part of the former Soviet Union, alcohol flows relatively freely. You rarely hear the call to prayer. On the other hand, some Islamic traditions remain–but we had not identified them as Islamic before. The headscarves that women wear here seemed to us in 2003 more a secular cultural habit than a religious requirement–but having come from Iran it is clear to us now that the covering is intended as a sign of Muslim modesty, not just a fashion statement. The bearded men also carry a special meaning, of religious piety, that was perhaps less obvious before.

The layout of the old city of Bukhara also meant something to us that it hadn’t before. Bukhara contains these standalone structures called “trading domes.” In our first visit we found them incredibly romantic, as relics of the silk road trade. The trading domes are still used to sell merchandise, and as Derek saw once in some old photographs the merchandise is surprisingly the same–people back then wanted to buy in Bukhara items quite similar to what tourists want to buy today, crafts, luxuries, souvenirs. (Having recently been to India and Iran, it was fun trying to identify where various items for sale had originated. There were Kashmiri embroideries similar to what we had seen in Kerala and Iranian handicrafts identical to what is on sale in Esfahan’s bazaar. Goods from Iran and India being sold in Bukhara is of course nothing new.) On this visit, we even changed money (with a shopkeeper) in the moneychangers’ dome, the bank in the old city having burned down. But having visited Iran, and seen bazaars that are intact and active, we understand now that Bukhara’s trading domes must have been mere pieces, junctions if you will, in what must have been a huge bazaar network that stretched through much of the heart of the old city. Bukhara’s bazaars must have been systematically destroyed, probably in the early twentieth century, leaving behind just the domes.

Trading islands, the second sadly with a parking lot in front.

In my post of 3.6, I considered how Varkala, India had changed from our visit in 2003 to 2008. I am surprised to see the extent to which the rise in international tourism has affected even Uzbekistan, a country in the middle of the middle of Asia and one that has fallen considerably out of favor with the west, politically, since 2003 (due to the 2005 Andijon massacre). When we were in Uzbekistan in 2003, there were of course tourists but quite few–a handful of overland backpackers and maybe two or three tour groups of elderly Europeans. The number of European tour groups has expanded dramatically, and added on now are casual vacationers, flying in and out of Uzbekistan on a week or two-week trip. Some French men that we ran into explained that Uzbekistan is “quite trendy” in France, and we were told that there are flights from Paris to Urgench (to facilitate a one-way Khiva to Tashkent trip) and, get this, from Verona to Samarkand. Along with the tourism has come some unattractive development–big new hotels surprisingly close to the center of the old town and some ugly life-size plastic camels located in the central square. But it’s hard to begrudge a place as special as Bukhara its popularity–let’s just hope that they keep a reign on new buildings in the old city lest the city lose its special charm. Only time will tell whether Bukhara will remain frozen in our minds in its current state or if we will find an excuse to visit yet again.

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faces photo Turkmenistan

Faces of Turkmenistan

Some portraits from our brief stay in Turkmenistan:

One way of categorizing countries may be countries where you can take pictures of police and soldiers and countries you cannot. Surprisingly, for a place reputed to be a police state, this Turkmen officer permitted Derek to take his picture. I believe the exaggerated brim must be a feature of the old Soviet police uniform, as we also recall it from our 2003 visit to Uzbekistan.

These girls must have been on their way to some sort of cultural performance. The Turkmen government, headed by former president Niyazov, has very aggressively pursued national cultural/heritage-type projects in an effort to develop a strong sense of national identity for the newly independent republic. Most famous among these is Niyazov’s book the Ruhnama, an epic telling the (legendary) history of the Turkmen people from ancient times to present, which is compulsory reading in Turkmen schools.

A blushing bride.

Gold-capped teeth–a very common Central Asian sight.

Some attractive young ladies. Derek thought Turkmen women were generally quite attractive.

In front, ethnically Russian but born in Turkmenistan.

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photo Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan Culture Shock

As I have explained previously, part of the spirit of an overland trip is seeing the connections between places–meeting Kurds in Syria and Iran, seeing how falafel changes from Syria to Jordan, making out modern differences among the various Gulf states. Equally educational, however, and quite shocking, was the complete change in atmosphere from Iran to Turkmenistan. In some ways, I thought that there might be some similarities–there are after all Turkmen in Iran, not to mention all the Azeri Turks (the largest second largest ethnic group, at around a quarter of the total population), both governments are infamous for being somewhat oppressive, or at least not beacons of freedom, and parts of the territory of modern Turkmenistan have often been part of same state or empire as now Iran through the years, giving the two countries a shared history.

All of the changes once we crossed the border were shocking. Gone of course were the chadors and veils and all the social/gender regulations of the Islamic Republic. That much could have been predicted, although the sight of women with free-flowing hair felt surprisingly novel. Also gone was the (albeit stressed) urban culture of Iran, with shaded streets and water flowing down the gutters–replaced with empty Soviet avenues and post-Soviet monuments to Niyazov, the former president also known as Turkmenbashi.

Long, beautiful hair!

For dinner in Merv we found ourselves in a bar with children pulling beer on tap and pouring vodka, scantily dressed Russian waitresses and, to our great delight, pork shashlik on the grill (which in fact is the first thing Derek mentions if asked about the country). Most surreal: The two friendly Turkmen that we met at the bar hounded us for a good 45 minutes to go with them to some sort of after-hours club (meaning past 11 p.m., the national curfew) to “fuck babies” as they described in their faulty English. Their sense of hospitality simply couldn’t stomach that we leave Turkmenistan without sleeping with a Russian or Turkmen woman–a sharp contrast to Iran, where such an act could bring severe criminal punishment. Just miles away on the other side of a border, was nearly everything forbidden in Iran, in such apparent abundance that a visitor had to expend effort not to partake.

The simplest answer, of course, is that Iran lay on one side, and Turkmenistan on the other, of the Iron Curtain. Turkmenistan and the other Central Asian republics were systematically secularized and made accustomed to the free flowing alcohol and more liberal sexual mores of the USSR, while in the last thirty years Iran moved dramatically in the opposite direction. It is a severe reminder of how much control a government can have over culture.

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Iran photo religion

On Iranian Identity

Traveling in Iran, we have come upon some interesting points on Iranian identity, relating to everything from Islam to Zoroastrianism, and the ancient Iranian empires to the State of Israel, which I thought would be worth covering in a post. It is interesting to see which strains of Iranian history and culture are emphasized by Iranians and the Iranian government, and why.

Iranians all over the country speak very proudly of the Achaemenids and the great Achaemenid site of Persepolis. I believe this is not only because there was so much that was great about the Achaemenid Empire, from its expansive territory to its successes as a truly cosmopolitan, universalist and seemingly benevolent world power, but because it (along with, to a lesser extent, the Sassanid Iranian Empire) represents what Iranians see as purely Iranian greatness, a past untainted by the Arab conquest, which is viewed largely as a destructive invasion by a relatively barbarian people. This focus on ancient, pre-Islamic Iran was also shared by the 20th century Pahlavi dynasty, which deliberately positioned itself as a continuation of Iran’s ancient past, including by naming itself after an ancient Iranian language. While there is something slightly sad about a country’s dwelling on its greatness of nearly 2,500 years ago, it is interesting to see how some Iranians, frustrated with and contemptuous of the current government, bulk the Islamic Revolution together with the Arab conquest and the coming of Islam as things that are non-Persian and bad, as defined against Cyrus the Great, Persepolis and all that is Persian and glorious.

One woman explained to us that Iran has a long tradition of gender equality going back to Achaemenid times, and that the concept of female subservience (including as promoted by the current government) is fundamentally Arab. Indeed, a paradox of Iran is that despite its laws it is in some ways more gender equal than other countries we have been to. Women here are quite visible in the workplace, unlike some parts of the Arab world, and many places, such as restaurants, that would be segregated in other parts of the Islamic world are not segregated in Iran. What makes Iran such a backward place, gender-wise, is largely not culture, the young woman argued, but merely law. (There is little doubt in my mind that Iran has the potential of far exceeding any other country in the region in gender equality and female success, socially and economically–even now, women make up a solid majority of Iranian university students.) Other people have told us that some Iranians are rejecting Islam altogether due to their disaffectedness with the Islamic authorities, turning instead to Zoroastrianism. One Zoroastrian pointed out to us that many Zoroastrian practices are not based in religion at all, but the ancient customs of the Aryan people. Viewed in this light, Zoroastrianism becomes an ancient and heroic Iranian alternative to Islam.

One young person we spoke to went so far as to say that the country’s present leaders are not Iranians at all, but Arabs. This statement isn’t accurate, of course, but there is what could be called a strain of Arab supremacy that runs through Iranian religious belief. As I mentioned in my post of 5.20 on Shia Islam, Iranian Muslims pay special respect not only to the twelve Imams of Twelver Shiite Islam but also their various relatives and indeed all other descendants of Mohammed. Such descendants are called seyeds and even have a special outfit, including a black turban.

A seyed, Esfahan

I was never able to confirm whether all such people are clerics, or have any special benefits under Iranian law, but it is certainly true that they are afforded respect and take enough pride in their designation to want to stand out (by their dress). Now, many countries have a notion of aristocracy–but it definitely seems strange that Iranians would be celebrating people who are, along at least one identifiable line of descent, not Iranian at all but Arab, given that Arabs as a rule are quite disliked by Iranians as barbarians who came and damaged the high culture of Iran.

Respect of seyeds is but one example of putting religion over ethnicity, also a common feature of a version of Iranian identity. Superficial but telling, the stress that the Islamic government of Iran places on religion over matters of national history is revealed in Iranian money. Iran is the only country I can think of that has, on its money, sites that are not located within the country’s borders. In Iran’s case, no bills contain Persepolis, in the hearts and minds of many Iranians and non-Iranians alike the most beloved and inspirational of Iran’s cultural heritage, but the 1000 and 2000 Rial notes do contain images of Mecca and Jerusalem.

1000 Rial and 2000 Rial notes, showing Islamic sites not in Iran

(Showing the political orientation of the money even further, the new 50,000 Rial note makes a special reference to Iran’s contentious nuclear program.)

One of the most significant areas in which Iran puts religious politics over ethnic politics is its virulent anti-Israel policy.

Anti-Israel mural, Tehran

I found myself asking, “Why should Iran even care about Israel?” Iranians generally have no fondness for Arabs, even if co-religionists, and go so far as to consider some of them, Saudis in particular, their enemies. Palestine is quite a distance from Iran, and, let’s face it, Iran and Israel in many senses don’t have anything to do with each other. Given that Jordan and Egypt, the countries actually bordering Israel and most affected by the problems rising from the existence of Israel, have made peace with Israel, why is it up to Iran to become a protagonist in that struggle? The answer is that through its struggle against Israel Iran believes that it is assuming leadership of the Islamic world, a mantle that Iran clearly desires. Do Iranians as a people have anything at stake? No. But the Islamic government does. (In one of the most perverse statements derived from propaganda that we heard in Iran, and generally we heard quite few, an otherwise smart man told us that Iran must oppose Israel now before Israel invades Iran, because the Zionists’ objective is to expand Israeli territory indefinitely. Today the West Bank, tomorrow Tehran? Also, note that the mural above is instructional in nature–if you are a follower of Imam Khomeini, you must support Palestinians (even if you didn’t know you cared about Israel).)

In addition to promoting Iran’s Islamic identity over Iran’s non-Islamic history, the Iranian government uses its religion of Shiite Islam specifically as a major building block of Iranian national identity.

One potential problem with Islam for Iranians, as I described above, is that it originated with Arabs, who are generally perceived quite negatively, and came to Iran through the Arab conquest, which is thought of as a destructive and negative period of Iranian history. Even today, Islam as a whole is in many ways dominated by Arabs. (We were told, for example, that the Saudis treat Iranians poorly in the hajj, assigning them substandard amenities and suboptimal access.) One “solution” for this problem has been the promotion within Iran of Shiite Islam, a sect that it would grow to dominate. Iran is now 90% Shiite Muslim, but it wasn’t always so; even up to the 17th century, there were as many Sunnis as Shiites in Iran. The balance was changed by the Safavid dynasty, which forced the conversions not only of Sunnis but also of Zoroastrians to Shiism. (I sometimes wonder why this sort of historical perspective does not make people question their beliefs.
)

One Iranian woman described Iran to me as “the center of Islamic culture.” Of course, many places can lay claim to that title, and more convincingly than Iran, but the Iranian government is hard at work promoting Iran as the center of Shiite Islam (a title it undoubtedly now holds). For the Safavids, the Shiite faith was a way for Iran to distinguish itself from the also-Islamic but Sunni Ottomans and Central Asians with whom Iran was at war, and to raise the prestige of Iran as a sort of sub-leader within the confines of what is in some ways a foreign faith (perhaps comparable to the state churches established during the Reformation). Shiism still serves the state function of helping strengthen national identity and status by acting as a brand of Islam that is Iranian rather than Arab. The current government continues to promote Iranian-style Shiism not only in Iran but throughout the Islamic world, by funding of Shiite mosques and otherwise, with the additional political aim of building support for Iran, Shiism’s center, within other countries.

Another way that the Iranian goverment uses religion is by creating confusion between faith and state. Iranian people are, undoubtedly, deeply religious, and the government equates religion and state such that it becomes difficult for Iranians to reject fully their government without in part rejecting their religion. One example of this is what I think is an ambiguous use of the word “martyr.” Immediately after the Islamic Revolution, Iraq took advantage of the chaos in Iran to launch an attack, leading to the debilitating Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988. Portraits of Iran-Iraq war “martyrs” are still painted on countless billboards and buildings. While calling war casualties “martyrs” no doubt helped the war effort (by borrowing from religious fervor), to me, dying in a war is not religious martyrdom even if your country has no separation of church and state. The Iranian government does not seem to recognize this distinction when bandying about the word “martyr.” According to one popular government slogan, a country whose citizens are willing to martyr themselves will never fail.

One can only wonder about a government that promotes the human sacrifice of its citizens.

The Iran-Iraq War served to unite the Iranian people under their new government, and the current government takes many actions to make the memories of the war endure despite the passage of much time, maintaining an atmosphere of perpetual war. An Iranian told us that Ahmedinejad recently had a plan to bury war dead in new memorials in every Iranian city, and another told us that now was not the time to push for political reform because the country is still recovering from the war.

I do not know if Iran is still in a period of recovery from the Iran-Iraq War, but it is clear that the wake of the Islamic Revolution, with its conscious and forceful reorientation of Iranian identity, has not settled. Of course, all the strains of Iranian identity will continue to co-exist, as always, but it remains to be seen when a national sense of balance will be reached.

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Iran photo queer

Gay Life in Iran

Our introduction to gay life in Iran was a strange one. Our first evening in Iran, while walking around Shiraz looking for something to eat, we crossed a public square in the middle of town that at first glance did not seem out of the ordinary, but turned out to be one of the most aggressive gay cruising grounds we had ever seen. The first man we met had an extremely high feminine voice (although he was like 6’2″) and showed Derek a (straight) porn video that was on his mobile phone, suggesting that we walk over to his house. The second started with polite chatter but then moved quickly to sex (“In America, man on man okay?”), repeatedly asking Derek the size of his, um, ****, and complaining about local sizes. Despite a very reserved appearance (he was an academic of some sort), this man was quite explicit about what he wanted, and persistent. (I suppose we could have just walked away, but while not sharing his interests we stuck around fruitlessly trying to engage him in more substantive conversation.) Passing through the same square on the way back from dinner, another man told us that he loved America and George Bush and said that George Bush was gay. All of this, happening on our first full night in Iran, was utterly surreal.

Having gay sex in Iran is a capital offense, as is well-known, and there have indeed been cases in which gay men have been executed (although it is not clear whether they were executed merely for homosexual sex or for that in combination with other crimes). Even if one is not executed, there is no doubt that punishment for being openly gay would be quick and harsh. Iranian President Ahmedinejad famously said at Columbia University that there are no gays in Iran, and one fairly liberal, open-minded Iranian we spoke to agreed with that statement, only acknowledging when pressed that there may be a handful, four or five. (Other Iranians did recognize that there were of course gays and lesbians in Iran, and were embarassed at the absurdity of the President’s statement, with which they were surprisingly familiar.)

So is there gay life in Iran? In one month, without much effort, we witnessed a surprising amount. Just by keeping our eyes open, we came across what we believe were four gay couples in Iran. One was relaxing by the river in a large Iranian city, one guy’s head in the other’s lap. In the same city, two other young men, rather similarly and tidily dressed, were walking hand-in-hand. Having just passed us on the street, they looked back and lifted their clasped hands to show that they were together, then a couple seconds later again looked back and lifted their hands. One young man showed us a tattoo on his arm apparently of his boyfriend’s name, which he showed to us saying, “I love [Abdullah],” and pointing to the young man next to him. A fourth couple was quite suggestively stroking each other’s hands and forearms on the Tehran subway, much to our shock. Some of you may argue that all these were the sort of liberal male/male expressions of closeness/friendship without any sexual content that one sees all over from the Middle East to India. As one man told us, two Iranian men can share a bed naked without fear of interpretation of homosexuality–it is just simply acceptable among male friends. But we’re quite familiar with those sorts of behaviors as well, from our experience traveling, and these were not those. In our best judgment, these individuals expressly signaled to us their sexuality (why us I’m not sure, other than that we are two foreign men), and we think they were gay.

The situation seems to be that public awareness of homosexuality is so low in Iran, being gay so unthinkable, that you can get away with a surprising amount of public displays of affection, certainly more than a heterosexual couple can. What we saw gay men do in Iran was beyond the mere friendly same-sex handholding as in India or elsewhere–they were flagrantly physically affectionate, with no-one the wiser.

Public awareness of homosexuality is so low, the possibility so far under people’s radar, that you can also have a public cruise in the center of town. In addition to the square in Shiraz, we visited a park in central Tehran known as a gay meeting place not only on gay websites but even in Lonely Planet.

In the early evening, gay men make up a small (though to the westerner easily identified) minority, among many young people and families, but grow to dominate the park more and more later at night, numbering in the dozens. The atmosphere was much lower key than Shiraz, with men talking to friends and saying hello to strangers but without a sense of desperation.

Park, at night

We were told that, during Khatami’s presidency, there were even drag queens or transsexuals in the park, but after the accession of Ahmedinejad the police came and arrested them, and ordered them never to return to the park again (better than the treatment of such people at the time of the Islamic Revolution–apparently transsexuals working in cabaret shows were put in large bags and thrown off of high places, a traditional Islamic punishment). The police continue to raid the park, including by posing as attractive young gay men on the prowl (of course, a classic ploy in the U.S. as well, as former Senator Larry Craig knows). If the police catch someone taking a compromising action or making a compromising statement, they make them sign statements promising never to return to the park–it is less clear what happens at a second offense.

Of course, banishment from the local park isn’t the only risk gay men face in Iran. We were told by one young man that he had been beaten up by basijis, a radical fanatical group that is a remnant from the Iran-Iraq war, near the park because he was perceived to be gay. Despite being able to hold your boyfriend’s hand in public, you can’t actually be “out,” or self-identified as a gay man or couple. One man told us that he was able to find and have sex but could not maintain a relationship for fear of exposure and total destruction of reputation and career. And, ultimately, there is the possibility of execution.

Two bonuses on this post, a poem and a joke.

A poem, mine:

Did guys in Texas fear being arrested
before Lawrence v. Texas the sodomy laws tested?
So the guys of Shiraz cruise the parks for the hung
with no ‘pparent fear that they too get hung.

One piece of “evidence” of the ancient and persistent existence of homosexuality in the Middle East (like anywhere else) is that many Middle Eastern countries have a city that is infamous for homosexuality, and the butt of all gay jokes in that country. In Iran, this city is Qazvin (we were there, but didn’t notice anything particularly gay about the place), and we even heard boys in Tehran teasing one another by saying that the other was from Qazvin. At our request, a gay Iranian told us this Qazvin joke:

The grim reaper came to collect the soul of a Qazvin man. “You may write a last statement,” the grim reaper said, “before you leave this world forever.” The man answered, “Oh, I’ve already prepared my statement–it’s under the bed. Could you bend over and get it?”

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Iran photo politics religion

The Hejab, or On Equality

There’s even a street named after it.

Iranian law enforces the hejab, or the Islamic dress code, on all women age 9 and over (corresponding to the age at which girls could be married in Iran immediately after the Islamic Revolution, although that age has since been changed). Iranian women do not wear the burqa, like women in parts of the Arab world and Afghanistan, but the rule seems to be that absolutely everything be covered except the face and hands. (This rule even applies to, with ridiculous effect, Iranian movies, in which female characters are covered even in domestic scenes in which in real life a woman would not be covered.) The hejab is often satisfied by wearing a chador, a very large piece of black cloth that is draped over one’s head and held in place with one’s teeth or hands to cover nearly the entire body but the face. Alternatively, and preferred by many women, is a coat (called a manteau and sometimes fitted), along with a headscarf. Young women in big cities flout the rules a bit by wearing shorter manteaus and wearing their headscarf rather “high” on the head, exposing a good portion of their hair. Some non-Muslim women tend to dress even a little more casually, perhaps exposing a little neck or ankle. [See my post of 6.4 for photos.] But the hejab is the law. If you break the law once, we are told that the police will just take you to the police station and call your family. But if you kept breaking the law, you would be fined and eventually end up in prison. The Ahmedinejad administration has ordered police crackdowns on the hejab, especially in the summers when the temperature climbs and it becomes tempting to relax one’s clothing. As once reported in the press, “Police will seize women with tight coats and cropped trousers.”

Bathroom sign

For some of you it may be tempting to view the hejab as something cultural, rules that we as non-Muslims may not be comfortable with but may well be desired by Iranians for the ordering of their society. I personally am certainly comfortable with traditional dress (cf. post of 4.16), and recognize that different cultures do find different clothes more or less acceptable or objectionable. But through our travels in Iran we have come to feel more strongly than ever that dress is an important form of personal expression, and that the legally enforced hejab is an unreasonable infringement of women’s liberties. (This may sound a bit American–and indeed I also find objectionable (although not in the same way) rules in France and Turkey that prohibit the wearing of headscarves.)

Often, in conversations with Iranian women, the hejab comes up. When we asked them what they think about having to wear the headscarf, we generally heard a curt “I hate it.” Young ladies that Derek tries to photograph will spontaneously point at their headscarves, saying that it’s ugly and that they would much prefer to be photographed without it (although of course that is not an option). Even women who said that they themselves would wear it even if it were not legally required, because it is dictated by their faith and tradition, told us that they did not think it should be the law, and that women should be free to choose. I do not know if there have been any reliable polls, but one fairly liberal, but older man thought that perhaps half of Iranian women would wear and half not wear the hejab if the law were lifted. (We were told by one older woman that, in Tehran before the Islamic Revolution, almost nobody wore headscarves, but the legal requirement in the last thirty years has restored the hejab to the level of social mores as well–even we started joking that women with high scarves must be of questionable morals, akin to a very short miniskirt–and if the law were revoked more women would probably wear headscarves than in pre-revolutionary days.) But just as women will object to the hejab, they will also point out that it’s just the tip of the iceberg, a meaningless symbol compared to the other social and legal handicaps women suffer in the Islamic Republic. Upon reflection, however, I have come to the belief that the hejab explains much about what is wrong with gender relations in Iran.

The first problem with the hejab is simple inequality. Although I believe that as a technical matter the hejab imposes restrictions on men as well (and at times men have been harassed by police for having “improper” hairstyles or whatever), from our experience the law doesn’t stop men from doing much of anything in the way of dress. Men wear short sleeves all the time, have all sorts of hairstyles from long to spiky, feel free to leave three or four buttons undone exposing a usually hairy chest and wear sandals exposing their feet. We’ve even been told that it’s okay to wear shorts, although we have not seen anyone doing this.

Exercising. The man looks a bit more comfortable, don’t you think?

Because the hejab is required for women when they may be in the presence of unrelated men, it creates for women a constant awareness of, a burden to check for, the possible presence of men. If dress is slightly relaxed, because they are alone or in a private place, they must rush to fix it if a man (especially an official) appears on the scene. It creates for women two spheres–the private, in which they are free to wear whatever they’d like, and the public, a space controlled by men in which they must modify their appearance. It is, simply put, a symbol of patriarchy.

No hejab, no service.

Another, deeper problem with the hejab revealed itself when we asked why it was necessary. What we were told repeatedly by men was that women need to conceal themselves in order to reduce temptation for and sexual violence by men. This is, of course, the exact mentality that allows rapists to defend themselves by pointing to the victim’s dress. This attitude is not only damaging to women, because it assigns female culpability to the male problem of sexual violence, but, I believe, also to men, who are seen in this view as totally lacking self-control. Indeed, some anecdotal evidence would suggest that this worldview generates male misbehavior–one young tourist we met in Tehran said that she received 10-20 unwanted and persistent advances by men each day, and another foreign woman temporarily living in Iran confirmed that Iranian men seem to have no sense of shame or fear of rejection. The Lonely Planet describes the Tehran subway as a “frotteur’s heaven.” Iranian men in the U.S. certainly don’t behave this way–it must be the culture of giving men a free pass and blaming women that causes it.

A few words on what tourists should do in Iran. One man we spoke to laughed bitterly when mentioning his conversations with female tourists from Europe who answered, when they were asked what they thought of Iran, simply that they liked Iran and that Iran was great. “What if they had to live here?” he asked, “What if there was an Islamic Republic of France? Let’s see what they’d say then.” After hearing this, we felt it our responsibility to be truthful, and not gloss over our true feelings on important questions simply because it is easier to avoid political issues.

Also, we have seen some Iranian domestic tourists from the larger cities avoid wearing their hejab when possible. For example, in a hotel lobby, two young ladies were sitting across from Derek without their scarves on, next to their scarf-wearing mother, and only rushed to put them back on, while expressing annoyance and rolling their eyes as they did it, when an Iranian man entered the room. On a daytrip to the countryside, some Iranian women in our group courageously took off their scarves, since they were in the presence of only western tourists and the tour op
erators. Sadly, on that tour, most of the western tourists kept their scarves on, no doubt not only because they were afraid of getting into trouble (we were told once that foreigners are levied a $3 fine), but because they thought that respecting local law was the “right thing to do.” But does this kind of law deserve respect? Or should the foreigners show solidarity with courageous Iranian women?

It may be the law, but does it deserve respect?

One story: We were showing New York postcards (which we carry for such show and tell) to three older women in a city park. They asked for a card, and we selected the one of Radio City Music Hall. Women are not allowed to sing or dance in public in Iran because the solo female voice and female dance are considered too seductive, causing many female musicians to move to the U.S. after the Iranian Revolution. We wrote on the back of the card, “In this place, they make music that could make you cry and there is beautiful dancing. One day, the people of Iran will dance and the women will sing. Iranian people will walk hand in hand with the rest of the world.” Each sentence was met with a quiet but firm “Inshallah [God willing].”

Categories
Iran photo politics queer religion

Freedom in Iran

To a liberal, open-minded Westerner, it may be all too easy to enter Iran thinking that maybe most Iranian people like the Islamic regime, that the country’s laws, while unappealing (to say the least) to us, are to them not only acceptable but what they expect, and how they want their society to be organized. It is tempting to think that the differences between the Iranian system and, say, the U.S. system can be written off to culture. People vote in Iran, after all, and in the last elections chose Ahmedinejad. Very quickly, within the first few days in Iran, this sort of relativism was wiped clean from our minds.

Iran is not a place where people are free to decide to be Muslim, or follow traditional behaviors, or be for or against the government; it is a place where people feel oppressed by the fanatically religious minority, the mullahs who have undemocratic, total control over the government and military and dictate a way of life that people would not choose. We heard it far and wide, from older women to youngsters, from Muslims to Zoroastrians, from big cities to smaller towns. Of course, we spoke more often with people who speak English, and we communicated (in English, through a translator or by non-verbal means) more often with people who reached out to talk to us, the foreigners, but our sample size was not small–Iranians are exceptionally friendly and we spoke to literally many dozens of people during our month in Iran. The bottom line is that people do not feel free in Iran, and that people have a strong desire to be free.

Two hand gestures became very familiar to us while traveling in Iran and communicating with locals. The first was a hand wrapping an imaginary turban on one’s head, a symbol for the theocratic elite of the country. Repeatedly, people would make the gesture, sometimes accompanied by the hand stroking an imaginary beard, to signify that it is the mullahs who have control and are mismanaging the country and restricting people from enjoying their lives in the manner that they wish. The second was the throat-cutting gesture, hand across the neck, which was used surprisingly often not only to describe what would happen to you if you tried to exercise a freedom that was not provided under Islamic law, but also as a general symbol for the government–nowhere else have we seen people associate their government so closely and so repeatedly with execution. One person told us that the only thing stopping the Islamic government from restoring stoning as a form of punishment is international pressure.

What freedoms are missing in Iran? Iran is in some ways more free than other countries we have visited. Some public criticism of government officials (though not the unelected religious hierarchy) is permitted in the press, particularly since the Khatami presidency. Traveling about the country, it feels less like a police state than Syria, where to take a long-distance bus trip your ID is checked, or Uzbekistan, where during our visit in 2003 there were frequent police checkpoints on the roads. The police presence in Iran is fairly minimal, and soldiers (usually fulfilling their compulsory military service) are friendly. What makes Iran different from other countries with comparable freedom deficits is that the freedoms unavailable in Iran are deeply personal, things that affect people on an intimate, daily basis. People speak of the censorship and lack of freedom in countries such as China, but the reality is that, day-to-day, most people in China can live largely as they wish, where their personal lives are concerned; the government does not seem to involve itself. Syrians, who seem to have almost no political freedoms but do have many personal ones under their secular government, still seem quite content with their government. Political freedoms, I feel after a month in Iran, are in a sense secondary to those personal liberties that we demand in our private lives. Of course in many cases, including possibly Iran, political freedoms are necessary to achieve the more personal ones, but if you had to choose only one, politics would come second.

After one young man told us that the thing he wished most for Iran was freedom, we asked him, “What does freedom mean to you?” “I wish I could hold my girlfriend’s hand in the street,” was his reply. Romantic/Sexual freedom is core to our identity as humans (or even deeper, to our animal souls), and one area in which the Iranian government is particularly active. We were told by one man that he is afraid even to walk down the street with his girlfriend, because of the ever-present possibility of adverse action by the police. While young people often have illicit (sexual) relationships, the dating scene is so limited that almost everyone we heard having been married or about to be married was married or engaged to his or her cousin (though this may also have to do with the frequency of arranged marriages). Forms of sexual expression that may be illegal in other countries as well, but are likely usually tolerated, such as adultery and homosexuality, are capital offenses. One man told us that, if a man discovered that his new wife is not a virgin, he would have the right to annul the marriage and likely without much legal repercussion kill the man who had slept with her.

Freedom of religion/conscience is also core to our identities. While Iran permits the practice of certain non-Islamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism), following long-established Islamic custom, there are also severe restrictions on religious belief. Perhaps most shockingly, apostasy, or renunciation of Islam by a Muslim, is punishable by death. Given this ban, the permitted minority religions are not allowed to proselytize, nor are they allowed to worship publicly. Religions other than the permitted ones, including most infamously the Bahai faith, are severely persecuted with the full force of the state. Atheism, of course, is unthinkable.

When it comes to one’s romantic/sexual life or one’s faith, however, people will to some extent act according to their desires, regardless of the law. We were told that non-martial sexual relations were fairly common among young Iranians, some engaging in anal intercourse to preserve the woman’s technical virginity. Many of Iran’s parks, especially those located somewhat outside of city centers, are filled with amorous young couples hiding among the trees. There is even a dangerous but not-so-underground gay life in the big cities [see my post also of 6.6]. Similarly, Mohammed himself said that there is no compulsion in matters of religion, and people in Iran believe in their hearts and minds many things deviant from the Islamic legal requirements. We were told by several Iranians that it is common for a person to be a Muslim on paper (Iranian government ID cards state the citizen’s religion), but not be one in spirit. One woman we spoke to said that her father and her siblings were all essentially atheists, and that her father encouraged her to learn about other religions and to pick a faith that feels right to her. Another young man, who had grown to equate Islam with the hated Iranian government, told us outright that “Islam is shit” (!) and that he wanted to become Christian. (We tried with little traction to tell him that there were plenty of bad Christians in the world as well.) He wore on his neck a cross, which had been given to him by his parents, who accepted his choice. It was a shock to see in front of us a man actually wearing around his neck evidence that could be used to convict him of a capital offense.

Cross on the neck of a Muslim man who wished to convert to Christianity, a capital crime. After we took this photograph, the man, to our surprise, asked us to re-take the picture, with his face. Later, his friend reminded us never to show that second photograph to anyone (of course we had no intention), using the throat-cutting gesture.

But of
course people, while acting outside of the law, remain afraid. Iranians love to talk about politics, and wanted to talk to us about politics, but also let us know that they feared that our conversation was somehow being monitored. People told us that we, as Americans, were likely being followed, and a man who had invited us into his family home (such invitations are not uncommon in Iran, one of the friendliest and most hospitable countries in the world) was certain that the police knew that we were there. One man who wanted to speak to us had us step away from his university classmates, because he didn’t feel he could trust them not to report the conversation. The apparent total control that the government has, its apparent ability to monitor its citizens’ activities and the severe punishments provided under the law lead to a general sense of distrust and paranoia. Without such intimate and essential freedoms as sex and faith, nearly everyone becomes a potential criminal and target of the state, a person who has to live with distrust, paranoia and potential severe punishment.

All this leads to a sense of discontent and pessimism that we have not seen in many countries. One woman told us when we said we were from New York, “I wish I was born in America.” One young girl we spoke to, when we showed her pictures from New York, said that if she lived in New York she would never come to Iran. Another young man, hearing that we were American, said, “New York, yes. Los Angeles, yes. Iran, no. Mullah, ech,” and wrapped an imaginary turban about his head. “Will things change?” we often asked. The answer generally fell somewhere between thirty years and never. Those who were the most pessimistic said that their government was deliberately keeping the country at a relatively poor state of economic development, so that people would not have the energy for political action or rebellion. Others said that the mullahs very carefully calibrated the laws to give Iranians a modicum of freedom, such as the relatively recent allowing of women to ride bicycles, a change that an optimistic Iranian specifically identified to us as a sign of progress in Iran (though to us of course it sounded absurd). Multiple people said that the government encouraged the relatively free availability of hard drugs in Iran, because the religious elite prefers that young people be chemically dependent rather than politically active. One person painfully pointed out that Western governments don’t really even care about the Iranian people, raising a conflict with Iran only when it comes to issues of security such as the nuclear program.

Lee Bollinger said in his introduction to Ahmedinejad’s address at Columbia University that “there are not enough prisons to prevent an entire society that wants its freedom from achieving it.” In the longest conversations we had with Iranians, I tried to remind them of this, and I must confess that I cannot entirely understand why 100,000 women in Tehran, Shiraz and the other biggest cities don’t just suddenly take off their headscarves one day. But of course I understand that there are real risks, and that, while Iranians may be able to sense and desire the freedoms that we take as essential, I cannot feel the fear that someone who grew up in the Islamic regime feels. Until the day comes when freedoms are restored in Iran, many Iranian people will have to continue living parts of their lives underground, or emigrate, as so many are choosing. One fellow traveler we met in Iran, an Irishman, said that he would kiss the ground when he returned home. And indeed visiting Iran does make a visitor appreciate the freedoms he enjoys back home–but a better reaction than smugness or selfish relief is outrage, for these are freedoms that we should all be able to take for granted, should not even have to be thankful for. How to direct one’s outrage remains, of course, a difficult question.